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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
jury may now exercise discretion which was not previously avail-
able in applying antitrust standards to labor-management agreements.
This may give rise to evidentiary difficulties in ascertaining whether
a union was acting alone or in concert with other employers.
Especially significant is the fact that there was no direct evidence of
a conspiracy in Pennington, but that this fact was inferred from
the wage agreement and the circumstances arising therefrom. There
may also be a judicial tendency toward a liberal construction of the
"conspiracy" concept, which may lead to antitrust convictions on
the basis of a collective bargaining agreement alone.3 9
The instant case represents a setback for organized labor.
Unions will be more restrained at the bargaining table; they will
try to avoid non-mandatory subjects in fear of setting adverse
precedent. In addition, there is the possibility of court-and-jury-
made labor legislation," which may reflect the growing dissatisfac-
tion with union policies which has asserted itself in the past two
decades.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - STATE'S POWER To REGULATE NON-
RETAIL PRICING OF LIQUOR HELD CONSTITUTIONAL. - Plaintiff
sought an injunction to restrain the enforcement of that section of
the New York Alcoholic Beverage Control Law which regulated
the price at which brand-name liquor was sold in New York.'
Plaintiff contended that since the law was not designed to promote
temperance, it was an unconstitutional exercise of police power and
an unjustified interference with interstate commerce. In sustaining
the statute, the Court of Appeals, in a four to three decision, held
that the regulation was within the broad police power traditionally
exercised by the states under the twenty-first amendment. Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 16 N.Y.2d 47, 209 N.E.2d
701, 262 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1965).
39 It is possible that the "most favored nation" clause, found in many
labor-management agreements, is now invalid according to the instant case.
This clause allows renegotiation by the employer if competitors secure more
favorable terms from the union. 59 LAB. Rr. REP. (27 L.R.R.M.) 238,
242-43 (Aug. 2, 1965).
40 This is the reasoning of Justice Goldberg. Supra note 34, at 697
(concurring opinion).
I The section provided that vendors must sell brand-name liquor in
New York at prices certified by them to be no higher than the lowest price
at which the brand was sold to any wholesaler or state agency elsewhere
in the country, during the previous month. N.Y. ALCO. BilT. CON6iOL LAw
§ 101-b(3) (d)-(k) (Supp. 1965).
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Historically, because of their unique and deleterious effects on
individuals and society, intoxicating beverages have often been
the subject of special regulation. 2  In recognition of this fact, the
twenty-first amendment of the United States Constitution has
granted extensive powers to the state. It provides that "the trans-
portation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of
the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors,
in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." While it
has been asserted that the purpose of this section was solely to
protect "dry" states from the importation of liquor from "wet"
states,3 the United States Supreme Court has in some instances
given it a much broader interpretation.
The state's power to forbid importation of liquor for non-
compliance with its statutory conditions was sustained in State Bd.
of Equalization v. Young's Mkt. Co.4 The Court noted therein
that the state's license fee on beer importers would have violated the
commerce clause as a direct burden on interstate commerce before
the enactment of the twenty-first amendment. In a subsequent case,
the Court unequivocally held the amendment to render the equal
protection clause inoperative. 5 Furthermore, relying on Young's
Market, the Court has sustained regulations retaliating against the
restrictive measures imposed by sister states.6 In one such case,
Justice Brandeis, speaking for the Court, indicated that whether or
not the law is best described as a protective measure is of no
moment, "for whatever its character, the law is valid." 7 In Joseph
S. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, justice Brandeis reiterated the view
that under the twenty-first amendment, it is immaterial that the
statute "does not relate to protection of the health, safety, and
morality or the promotion of their social welfare, but is merely an
economic weapon of retaliation.""
Two decisions of the Court have recently limited the regulatory
power of the state where liquor was not "for delivery or use there-
in." In one case, a tax upon imported whiskey remaining in the
original package was struck down; 9 in another the Court held that
2 Rupert v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 138 Conn. 669, 674, 88 A2d 388,
390 (1952); State ex rel. Wilkdnson v. Murphy, 237 Ala. 332, 337, 186
So. 487, 492 (1939).
3 Byse, Alcoholic Beverage Control Before Repeal, 7 LAW & CONTFmP.
PnoB. 544, 567 (1940).
'299 U.S. 59, 62 (1936).
SMahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401 (1938).Joseph S. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395 (1939) ; Indianapolis
Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Conm'n, 305 U.S. 391 (1939).
7 Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, supra note 6,
at 394. (Emphasis added.)8 Joseph S. Finch & Co. v. McKittrilc, supra note 6, at 397-98.
9 Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S.
341 (1964). The invalidation of the tax, as a per se violation of the export-
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the commerce clause precluded a state from regulating the mere sale
of liquor within the state, when it was transported through the
state. 10
In view of the holdings in these cases, it has been asserted that
the language of the Court portends a change in judicial attitude.,,
In fact, it has been suggested that in Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon
Voyage Liquor Corp.,12 the Court withdrew traditional coisthutional
immunity from states when statutes did not purposely att nipt to
protect the citizens of the state from the evils of intoxicating.bever-
ages.' 3 However, an analysis of Hostetter and other decisions
would seem to indicate that no significant change has taken place
with respect to the Court's position on the regulation of intrastate
consumption of intoxicants. In these opinions, the state's plenary
power to regulate liquor commerce terminating within the state was
distinguished from its limited control over liquor merely passing
through the state in interstate commerce.14
In the instant case, the majority' believed that as a result of a
long history of regulation and control, the liquor industry cannot
claim a "constitutional legal parity" with dealers in other goods.' 5
After tracing earlier cases decided in favor of the states on the
basis of their extensive police power under the twenty-first amend-
ment, Judge Bergan, speaking for the majority, concluded that the
statute in question was constitutionally valid. He regarded as
import clause, ended fears that this provision would also be made ineffective
by the amendment. Note, 7 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 402, 414 (1939); Note, 55
YALE L.J. 815, 816 (1946).
10 Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
Plaintiff purchased liquor tax-free outside of New York State, and sold
it to outgoing passengers on an international flight. The liquor was then
placed on the airplane and was delivered to the passenger at the foreign
destination. Two earlier decisions (Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry
Co., 304 U.S. 518 (1938), and Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 321
U.S. 383 (1944)) denied states the power to prohibit liquor from passing
through the state to an area under federal jurisdiction.
"1 See The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HARv. L. REv. 143, 240 (1964).
In 1936, the Court in State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Mkt. Co., 299
U.S. 59 (1936), stated: "A classification recognized by the Twenty-first
Amendment cannot be deemed forbidden by the Fourteenth." Id. at 64.
Compare this language with the Court's 1964 statement: "Both the Twenty-
first Amendment and the Commerce Clause are parts of the same Con-
stitution. Like other provisions of the Constitution, each must be con-
sidered in the light of the other, and in the context of issues and interests
at stake in any concrete case." Hostetter v. Idlewild Boan Voyage Liquor
Corp., supra note- 10, at 332.
12 Supra note 10.
13 See generally 6 B.C. Imn. & Com. L. Ray. 336, 343 (1965).
'14A state is empowered to supervise and regulate liquor passing through
its territory in order to guard against intrastate consumption. Hostetter v.
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., supra note 10, at 328.
15 Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 16 N.Y2d 47, 56, 209
N.E.2d 701, 704, 262 N.Y.S.2d 75, 79 (1965).
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thoroughly settled the principle that a state may exercise police
power in a plenary fashion when regulating liquor traffic without
violating either the commerce clause, or the equal protection clause
of the Constitution."6 The Court also noted that the effects of this
regulation on interstate commerce would be merely incidental and
would not constitute a substantial interference. To the argument
that the statute did not seek to foster temperance, the customary
touchstone for a regulation of liquor, the Court replied: "As to
what best promotes temperance . . . it seems preferable to take the
opinion of the ... Legislature rather than that of the liquor in-
dustry." 17
Judge Desmond, dissenting, argued that regulatory statutes can-
not be valid unless reasonably designed to promote health, safety,
or public welfare. He observed that due process requires that such
measures should not be arbitrary, and that even the exercise of the
police power should be 'subject to judicial review when it departs
from these stated purposes. As to the objectives sought to be at-
tained by the statute, he* said:
No one has yet told us how any of these lawful purposes could be ac-
complished or furthered by forcing liquor prices down to the bottom
level found anywhere in the United States. To promote temperance" by
making intoxicants cheaper is like trying to minimize the dangers of
excessive smoking by abolishing cigarette taxes.:"
Judge Desmond would require a justifiable end for any regula-
tion, without which an exercise of police power is invalid-here,
he found the justifiable end of temperance to be lacking.
Despite the majority's conclusion that the statute will have only
an incidental effect upon interstate commerce, it seems likely that
the "no higher than the lowest" provision will have economic im-
pact across the country. Distillers will undoubtedly be forced to
shape their national marketing practices so as to maintain profitable
sales in the large New York market. To command a reasonable
price in New York, the industry may have to charge artificially high
prices in other states. Distillers would be loath to give price re-
duction to purchasers in other states, when by doing so they would
be compelled to grant the same reduction to every purchaser in
New York. The act will thus detrimentally affect marketing prac-
tices outside of New York, and will tend to set a nation-wide
minimum price level for brand-name liquor.
1a Id. at 57, 209 N.E2d at 705, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
17 Id. at 60, 209 N.E.2d at 706, 262 N.Y.S2d at 82. The Court noted
that the legislature had found "no correlation between consumption and
prices looking at the experience in states in which prices were high compared
to those in which they were low." Id. at 54, 209 N.E._d at 703, 262 N.Y.S.2d
at 77.18 Id. at 61, 209 N.E.2d at 707, 262 N.Y.S2d at 83-84.
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If New York may enact such a pricing restriction, so may
other states. If two or more states enacted such regulations, a
distiller would be unable to raise his price in one jurisdiction, with-
out violating the law in another. In this manner prices could
become "frozen," with the distiller powerless to legally increase
them unless he withdrew his product for one month from the market
of one of the regulated states.
If, as the New York Court of Appeals has decided, this
statute does not interfere with interstate commerce then, it would
seem, similar measures may be enacted for any commodity subject
to price regulation.
Even if it were conceded that the statute would have significant
effects upon interstate commerce, the Court's decision appears to
be aligned with the weight of settled judicial precedent in this
area. Past United States Supreme Court decisions have established
the overriding regulatory power of the states even when the objec-
tion of interference with interstate commerce has been raised.'0
Although the dissent has argued that valid liquor regulation must
be based on the promotion of temperance, the state's ability to con-
trol the sale of liquor embraces other traditional purposes of the
police power, e.g., controlling price discrimination and monopolistic
practices. 20 In the context of a comprehensive regulatory program
controlling distribution, sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages,
a legislatively promoted decrease in liquor prices cannot be con-
strued in isolation as an abdication of the responsibility to promote
temperance.
Should the appeal of this decision be entertained by the Su-
preme Court, a crucial issue confronting that tribunal will be the
role of the twenty-first amendment in this controversy. The clear
import of the amendment grants to the states the power to regulate
liquor in any manner designed to promote the general welfare.
Unless the heavy influence of the traditionally free reign given to
the states by this amendment has considerably lessened, it appears
likely that the outcome of the instant case will be sustained.
19 See, e.g., State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Mkt. Co., supra note
11; Joseph S. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, smpra note 6.
20 The declared policy of N.Y. ALcO. Bay. CONTROL LAw § 101-b (3) (d)-
(k) (Supp. 1965) was:
(a) that fundamental principles of price competition should prevail ...(b) that consumers . .. in this state should not be discriminated against
. . . by paying unjustifiably higher prices for brands of liquor than
are paid by consumers in other states...
(c) . . . to forestall possible monopolistic and anti-competitive practices
designed to frustrate the elimination of such discrimination ... N.Y.
Sess. Laws 1964, ch. 531, § 8.
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EVIDENcE- ANTISPOUSAL TESTIMONY COMPETENT WHERE
CH D MURDERE By HUSBAND.- Appellant, after conviction for
the murder of his child, assigned as error the admission of his
wife's testimony without his consent, in violation of a Colorado
statute.' The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the conviction
holding that the murder of the child by his father was a crime com.
mitted against the mother making her competent to testify against
her husband. Balltrip v. People, 401 P.2d 259 (Colo. 1965).
At common law, one spouse could not testify against or on
behalf of the other in any action to which the other was a party.2
It has been stated that this rule was an outgrowth of the "quia sunt
duae anirnae in came una' or "unity" concept.3 Three dominant
reasons have been suggested for this policy: (1) to discourage
strife between spouses and, thereby, to help preserve their marital
relationship;4 (2) to prevent false testimony prompted by one
spouse's self-interest in the outcome;5 and, (3) to prohibit testi-
mony repugnant to a sense of fair-play.8
Notwithstanding these reasons, the common law recognized that
severe injustice could result from preventing one spouse from
testifying in cases of personal injury inflicted by the other. Hence,
an exception arose whereby competency was granted in such
cases to the injured spouse.7 The interpretation of what con-
stituted "personal injury to the spouse" was dependent upon
judicial determination.
For example, West Virginia adopted a strict interpretation in
State v. Woodrow." There, while committing an assault upon his
wife who was holding their child in her arms, the husband fired a
bullet which passed through the child's head and struck the wife.
The court held that the murder of the child did not constitute a
"personal injury to the spouse" within the common-law meaning of
that phrase as incorporated in the West Virginia statuteY The
criticism aroused by this case resulted in the enactment of a statute
which specifically provided that one spouse was competent to testify
against the other when there was personal injury to him, or to the
child, father, mother, brother or sister of either spouse.' 0
COLo. REV. STA.. ANN. § 153-1-7 (1953).
2 Bassett v. United States, 137 U.S. 496, 505 (1890).
3 Note, Should the Rule Prohibiting Antispousal Testimony be Abolished?,
15 U. Ptrr. L. Rwv. 318, 319-20 (1954).
4 Jenkins v. State, 191 Ark. 625, 627, 87 S.W.2d 78, 79 (1935).
5 Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 75 (1958).
8 WIGmoRE, EvneNcE § 2228 (McNaughton rev. 1961).7 Bassett v. United States, 137 U.S. 496 (1890).8 58 W. Va. 527, 52 S.E. 545 (1905); accord, Grier v. State, 158 Ga.
321, 123 S.E. 210 (1924).
9 It was held: "The act must touch her person, or her personal
individual right, as a person distinct and individual from the community...
State v. Woodrow, 58 W. Va. 527, 529, 52 S.E. 545, 546 (1905).10W. Vi. CODE ANN. § 5728 (1961).
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A case of similar import was Jenkins v. State,': wherein the wife
was tried for the poisoning of her three children. The Supreme
Court of Arkansas held that the testimony of the husband was
inadmissible since the children were not property within the meaning
of a statute which permitted a spouse to testify only in cases of
injury to his person or property. 22
The federal courts have generally followed the strict interpreta-
tion given "injury to the spouse" in Bassett v. United States. 3 In
that case, the United States Supreme Court declared that polygamy
was not an "injury to the spouse" sufficient to bring it within the
exception to the common-law rule as embodied in a Utah statute.
As a result, only in prosecutions for violations of the Mann Act 14
or for crimes committed directly against the spouse 5 have the fed-
eral courts permitted one spouse to testify against the other.
Today, every state has a statute affecting the competency of
one spouse t6 testify against the other. Four states have retained
the common-law rule by enacting statutes providing that one spouse
is incompetent to testify against the other in the absence of a crime
committed by one against the other.' 6 Eleven jurisdictions allow
a spouse ib testify for, but not against the other, except in cases
of, criies by one against the other.' 7 In fourteen states consent is
required before one spouse is allowed to testify against the other,
although this may not be necessary in cases of injury to one spouse
inflicted by the other.'8 Twerty states declare that one spouse is
"L 191 Ark. 625, 87 S.W.2d 78 (1935).
12 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2020 (1947).
13 Supra note 7.
14 Yoder v. United States, 80 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1935). The statute
forbids the transpoitation of any woman in interstate or foreign commerce
for the purposes of prostitution, debauchery or other immoral acts. 18 U.S.C.
§§2421-23 (1964).
'5 Kerr v. United States, 11 F.2d 227 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 271
U.S. 689 (1926); United States v. Smallwood, 27 Fed. Cas. 1131 (No.
16,316) (C.C.D.C. 1836); United States v. Graham, 87 F. Supp. 237 (E.D.
Mich. 1949).
a6 IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.7 (1946); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-8802(1947); N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:84A-17 (1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19§§ 683-85 (Purdon 1964).
"7 ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-2019, 20 (1947) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-84(1960); HAWAn REv. LAWS §§222-18, 19 (1955); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§62-1420 (1964); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§491.020, 546.260 (1959); NEB. REV.
STAT. §25-1203 (1964); N.M. STAT. ANN. §40A-1-12 (1963); N.C. GEr.
STAT. ANN. §8-57 (Cum. Supp. 1963); Ox.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 702(Cum. Supp. 1964); TEX. CODE CRim. Pnoc. art. 714 (1954); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 1-142 (1957).is Aiz. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1802 (Cum. Supp. 1964); CAL. PEN. COD.§ 1322 (1961 ed.); COLO. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 153-1-7 (1953); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 9-203 (Supp. 1965); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (1947); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 1689 (1954); NEv. Rsv. STAT. § 48.040 (1963); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 31-01-02 (1960); ORE. REV. STAT. § 139.320 (1961); S.D. CODE§ 36.0101 (1960); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-44-4 (1953); VA. CoD ANN.
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generally as competent to testify against the other spouse as any
other witness.19 However, many of these statutes forbid the spouse
from divulging confidential communications.20 Alaska appears to be
the only state that does not have a general declaration on the com-
petency of the spouse, but it allows such testimony in enumerated
instances.21
The Colorado statute construed in the instant case allows one
spouse to testify against the other if there is consent. Again, such
consent is unnecessary where the action involves injury inflicted by
one spouse upon the other.22 In deciding that perjury in a divorce
action was a crime against the spouse, the Supreme Court of
Colorado, in Dill v. People, declared that the wife could testify
against her husband since "she is the individual particularly and
directly injured or affected by the crime for which he is being
prosecuted." .23 The Colorado courts were thereafter to hold that
bigamy,24 or the rape of a child by its father 25 were injuries suf-
ficiently affecting the other so as to make the injured spouse com-
petent to testify.
The Court in O'Loughlin v. People20 was faced with circum-
stances similar to those in the instant case. Noting that the murder
of a child was as offensive, and therefore, as likely to directly affect
the spouse as the rape of a child, the court held that the murder of
a child was a "crime against the spouse" within the meaning of the
statute.
The Court in the instant case relied entirely on O'Loughlin and
reiterated that the murder of their child by one spouse was an
injury to the other, making the latter a competent witness. Al-
though this case appears to be based upon precedent established in
Colorado, it is in opposition to the Bassett, Woodrow, and Jenkins
§ 8-288 (Cum. Supp. 1964); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.061 (Supp.
1963); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 5727-729 (1961).
19 ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 311 (1958) ; DEL. CoDE ANN. tit 11, § 3502 (1953);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 90.04, 932.31 (1963); GA. CoDE ANN. § 38-1604 (Cum.
Supp. 1963); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 155-1 (Smith-Hurd 1964); IND.
ANN. STAT. §§ 2-1713, 1714 (1946) ; Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.210 (1962);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:461, 462 (1950); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 15,§ 1315 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 4 (1957) ; MASs. ANN. LAws ch. 233,
§ 20 (Supp. 1964); MicHr. STAT. ANN. §§ 27A.2158, 2162 (1962); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. §516:27 (1955); N.Y. PEN. LAw § 2445; OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2317.02 (Baldwin 1964); RLI. GEN. LAws ANN. § 12-17-10 (1956);
S.C. CODE § 26-403 (1952); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-103 (1955); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, §§ 207, 268, tit. 12, § 1605 (1959); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 325.18
(1963).2 0 E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 2-1713, 1714 (1946); N.Y. PEN. LAW § 2445.
2 1 Ar-,SKA STAT. ANN. §§ 11.40.430, 11.40.310 (1962).22Supra note 1.
23 19 Colo. 469, 475, 36 Pac. 229, 233 (1894).
24 Schell v. People, 65 Colo. 116, 173 Pac. 1141 (1918).
25 Wilkinson v. People, 86 Colo. 406, 282 Pac. 257 (1929).
2690 Colo. 368, 10 P.2d 543 (1932).
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rules previously discussed. Thus, it would seem appropriate to
examine the soundness of the Colorado rule.
The primary consideration for the non-admissibility of a
spouse's testimony is that it would be disruptive of the marital rela-
tionship. However, the "unity" of the marriage upon which the
policy of the law was founded may have already been destroyed.
Illustrative is the fact that one spouse has committed bigamy or has
raped his own child. Examples could be multiplied. It is sub-
mitted that a crime committed by one spouse and witnessed by the
other is more of a strain to the marital trust and tranquility than
the disclosure of that crime in a court of law. The breach of
marital unity is accomplished by the commission of the crime, and
not by the testimony in a courtroom.
Moreover, as a national phenomenon, modern social and legal
theories have challenged the validity of the "unity" concept. For
example, the laws in many states have been revised to facilitate
divorce actions. In addition, women are permitted to own property
in their own right and enjoy the privilege of contracting in their
own nme.2 7 Thus, its rigor partially vitiated, the "unity" concept
may be viewed in some of its aspects as a legal platitude, rather
than as a subsisting social actuality.
Another consideration is the evidentiary value of such testi-
mony. At common law such evidence was excluded on the ground
of bias. However, the United States Supreme Court has allowed
one spouse to testify on behalf of the other because of an apparent
shift in policy based upon state statutes.28  Moreover, the Court
has shown recent approval of a tendency to allow a spouse to
testify against the other in prosecutions for violations of the Mann
Act.29  It would appear then, that the courts will make liberal use
of the common-law exception, viz., "crime against the spouse," to
effect the admission of a spouse's testimony as an element of rele-
vant evidence. It may be argued that should one spouse feel vindic-
tive toward the other, it would be possible for him, or her, to testify
falsely. However, it has always been the difficult task of the jury
to determine the credibility of witnesses, and one could predict
that they would find no more difficulty in this area than in any
other.30
Whether an injury to a child is an injury to a spouse is a
question still very much in conflict. It is not doubted that the
Colorado courts have been correct in determining that crimes against
27 United States v. Graham, 87 F. Supp. 237 (E.D. Mich. 1949).
2s Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
29 See Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958) for the application
of FED. R. Cian. P. 26. See also Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525(1960).
30 See Note, Should the Rule Prohibiting Antispousal Testimony be
Abolisled?, 15 U. Pirr. L. REv. 318 (1954).
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the children are an "outrage upon nature in its dearest and tenderest
relations." 31 However, this is a use of the term "crime" in its
generic sense. Could the courts of Colorado charge a husband with
a crime arising from the single act of injuring his child, and addi-
tionally, charge him with a distinct and "personal" crime against
his wife? The answer would appear to be in the negative.
Although the result in the instant decision coincides with a
concept of justice in the case of injury to a close blood relation, the
Colorado courts would be hard pressed to extend it to cases of
violence perpetrated by one spouse upon a total stranger, and wit-
nessed by the other. Because of the construction of the Colorado
statute, the courts there may be committed to expanding the realm
of admissible testimony by a spouse in reference to "crimes com-
mitted by one against the other." It would appear that a statute is
needed whereby the courts of Colorado could allow the wife to
testify, and, at the same time, could preserve the concept of marital
confidence.
To this end, the statute could be modeled upon those presently
in force in New York and Illinois.
New York has approached the problem by declaring that
spouses are competent to testify except as to confidential com-
munications. 32 Illinois, on the other hand, does not recognize con-
fidential communications as privileged when there is injury to the
person or property of one spouse, or when the children are directly
injured by a spouse.3 3  Statutes such as these attempt to balance
the values of marital confidence with the practical realization that
an injured spouse should be allowed the same opportunity to testify
as any other injured person. In so doing they obviate the difficulties
inherent in strained judicial expansions, which are necessitated by
the restricted scope of statutes such as that construed in Balltrip.
IMMIGRATION -ILLEGITIMATE CHILD OF NATURALIZED CITI-
ZEN DEEMED STEPCHILD FOR IMMIGRATION PURPOSES.- The plain-
tiff, who married subsequent to becoming a naturalized United
States citizen, petitioned for a declaratory judgment classifying her
alien husband's illegitimate child as a nonquota immigrant. The
Board of Immigration Appeals sustained the District Director's
31 O'Loughlin v. People, 90 Colo. 368, 378, 10 P.2d 543, 547 (1932).
32 N.Y. Pre. LtAw § 2445. See People v. Harris, 39 Misc. 2d 193, 240
N.Y.S.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1963) wherein a spouse's letter, containing a con-
fession of guilt of the murder of the child, was held a confidential com-
munication when mailed only to the other spouse.
33 ILT ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 155-1 (Smith-Hurd 1964).
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